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Oshoring the nation’s water
When the 10 regional water authorities in England and Wales were floated on the London 
Stock Exchange in 1989, a shift in ownership inevitably followed from the privatisation of 
household water. The public listing of shares in water companies initially created a wide 
distribution of ownership across the UK population, with preference given to those who 
paid the water bills. Controls were put in place to ensure that no one individual or company 
could monopolise the shareholdings, with the UK government retaining a “golden share” 
precisely to avoid such an outcome. 
Once those shares were relinquished by the government in 1994, however, the ownership 
of the nation’s water started to shift abroad, with foreign investors largely attracted by 
the low-risk, stable returns on oer. Some two decades on, with seven of the 10 water 
authorities now in foreign ownership, the contrast from the idea of a British shareholding 
public that drove the early UK privatisations could not be greater.
But it is not simply the fact of foreign ownership itself that marks the contrast. It is the type
of foreign owner that draws the sharpest dierence: the movement into the water sector 
in recent years of privately run, global financial consortia for which infrastructure is a new 
and malleable asset class.
The shift in the pattern of ownership towards more consortia-led, global financial 
institutions has been accompanied by a delisting of water companies and a more opaque 
ownership structure involving so-called oshore locations and increasingly complex 
financial practices, none of which, it is fair to say, was foreseen by Ofwat, the industry’s 
regulator. In what follows, we outline the changing pattern of ownership in the English and 
Welsh water industry, using the examples of the consortia-led Anglian, Southern, Yorkshire 
and Thames Water to raise issues of accountability, transparency and financialisation. 
(Scottish Water is publicly owned, directly accountable to the Scottish Parliament.) After 
that, we spell out how things could be dierent, in terms of both ownership structure and 
the treatment of water as an asset managed for the benefit of customers.
Shifts in company ownership
Private provision of household water is not new to England and Wales, although 
it disappeared from view at the end of the 19th century when water delivery was 
municipalised, and then, in the 1970s, when it was eectively nationalised in the shape 
of the 10 water authorities that persist in much the same outline today. Whereas before 
privatisation, however, ownership and control were local and then regional, today they are 
thoroughly global and largely unlisted.
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Of the 10 privatised water companies, only three remain listed on the London Stock 
Exchange: Severn Trent, South West Water (under Pennon), and United Utilities, with a 
shareholding largely confined to institutional investors drawn from banks, insurance 
companies and pension funds. The public listing allows for a degree of accountability and 
transparency which is largely absent from the six unlisted, privately run, water companies. 
The exception is Welsh Water (Dwr Cymru), which is run as a not-for-profit company that 
has no shareholders, and to which we will return later.
The unlisted companies can be divided into two groups: those that are part of overseas 
infrastructure corporations owned by wealthy individuals, and those that are part of 
oshore corporate structures owned by global financial consortia. Table 1 (overleaf) 
provides a breakdown of the two types of unlisted ownership and their global investor 
profile.
The first group comprises Wessex Water – owned by the Malaysian conglomerate YTL 
Corporation, an investment vehicle for its billionaire founder Yeoh Tiong Lay – and 
Northumbrian Water, owned by Cheung Kong Infrastructure, controlled by Asia’s richest 
person, the Hong Kong-based Li Ka Shing. In contrast, the second group – Anglian Water, 
Southern Water, Yorkshire Water and Thames Water – are operated through special-
purpose vehicles, three of which are registered oshore in Jersey.
Anglian Water is owned by the Osprey Consortium, made up principally of Australian and 
Canadian pension and banking funds, with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia a key 
player. Southern Water is under the control of the Greensands Group, in which JP Morgan 
and UBS (respectively, US and Swiss banking and finance houses), along with Australian 
pension and asset management firms, are the major investors. Cheung Kong Infrastructure 
also hold investments in Southern, through Sumaya Investments. Yorkshire Water is 
owned by the Kelda Consortium, whose main investors include Deutsche Asset & Wealth 
Management; Corsair Capital, a New York-based private equity firm; and GIC, the private 
equity arm of Singapore Investment Corporation. Thames Water, the largest of the four 
companies, is owned by the Kemble Consortium, led by Australian bank the Macquarie 
Group. Macquarie is the largest investor, followed by Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, 
China Investment Corporation and, more recently, British Telecom. The remainder of 
investors comprise Canadian, Dutch, Spanish and Australian pension funds.
The sheer extent of global ownership across the four consortia-led water companies is 
revealing and may come as something of a surprise to their local customers. What marks 
them out from the likes of Wessex and Northumbria, however, is not simply the extent 
of overseas ownership, but their opaque corporate structures and seeming ability 
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Table 1: Global ownership of England’s water companies
Water company Investor Origin
Overseas infrastructure companies
1 Wessex Water YTL Corporation Malaysia
2 Northumbrian Water Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Hong Kong
Global financial consortia 
3 Anglian Water Colonial First State Global Asset 
Management







4 Southern Water JP Morgan Asset Management
Challenger Infrastructure Fund






















6 Thames Water Macquarie European Infrastructure Fund
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to financially engineer significant returns for their consortia-led owners over and above 
profits earned.
Financialising water
In comparison with the unlisted infrastructure companies, Anglian, Southern, Yorkshire 
and Thames all exhibit complex wedding cake-style corporate structures, with the global 
owners, the investors that comprise the consortia, at their apex. Below that sit a number 
of holding companies through which debts, dividends and interest payments on inter-
company loans move up, down and across the group structure. Given the 8-10 holding 
companies that typically separate the operational side of the water business from the 
owner proper, financial transparency is an obvious concern.
The actual regulated water companies form part of the base of the respective wedding-
cake structures, alongside an oshore financial oshoot whose role includes the leverage 
of debt through securitisation techniques, both to meet initial acquisition costs and to 
raise further debt by issuing bonds against revenue streams generated by water bills 
that households have yet to pay. More pointedly, all four water companies have been 
purchased with debt and refinanced with debt, to the point that around four-fifths of 
each company represents borrowed monies raised against future revenue. At the time 
of privatisation, given that all four companies had negative gearing, the extent of the 
debt which the water companies have been made to bear by their overseas owners is an 
obvious concern for their investment-grade ratings, particularly as it impacts upon their 
political rationale: their capacity to invest in sustaining the water network.
That said, the securitisation of debt does have the eect of freeing up value from the 
underlying asset and having the cash raised from the sale of securities at your disposal. 
It can be used to invest in upgrading infrastructure and as a means to simplify capital 
structures by reducing the peaks and troughs of debt repayments, with the eciencies 
passed on to customers in the form of lower water bills. The leveraging of debt, however, 
can also be used for other purposes: namely, to pay a higher shareholder dividend and 
pay o intra-company loans. 
In the case of Thames Water, for instance, their accounts show that the latter 
purposes rather than the former have more or less consistently been pursued, with 
the company paying out in dividends more than they actually earn from their cash 
flows and using the borrowed monies to fund substantial dividends to their investors.1
1 Allen, J & Pryke, M 2013 “Financialising Household Water: Thames Water, MEIF, and ‘Ring-fenced’ Politics“ in 
Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society no 6, pp419-439 
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Much the same has been shown to be true of Yorkshire Water.2 Indeed, the pattern of 
large regular dividends, as Seth Armitage3 has documented, is typical of the privatised, 
standalone water companies and is a particular feature of the consortia-led companies 
that operate on a highly geared basis. Overseas investors have also benefited from high 
interest loans paid to them by the water companies that they themselves own, with the 
company debt channelled through oshore holding companies so that interest goes to 
them tax-free, and has the added bonus of reducing taxable corporate profits in the UK.
The oshore route by which both dividends and company debt travels makes public 
scrutiny onerous, with disclosure far more limited than required by UK law. In eect, such 
oshore practices not only mask the ownership structures of the consortia-led firms; they 
also make it harder to trace the money leaving the UK by such routes and the ability 
to hold overseas owners to account. The nexus between financialisation and oshore 
dealings, in that respect, works to place the owners more or less out of reach and thus out 
of regulatory control when it comes to matters of who has benefited from the privatisation 
of the nation’s water.
Borrowing and finance costs turn on questions of ownership, public or private, local or 
global. Debt-driven, private finance is only one way by which UK water infrastructure may 
be funded and, likewise, oshore corporate structures are only one type of route by which 
water can be financially managed. Things could be dierent, most obviously if in public 
ownership, but even if the nation’s water remained in less profit-orientated private hands. 
Customising water
Returning water to public ownership is often seen as the obvious means to avoid the 
siphoning o of water profits into private hands and provide a more accountable service. 
Indeed, an increasingly Europe-wide disillusionment with the privatisation of household 
water has seen such services brought back into the fold of public ownership across France 
and Germany, as a process of remunicipalisation has taken hold.4 Driven, in part, by private-
sector failure and the control of assets that local ownership can provide, remunicipalisation 
oers a more accountable political choice of delivery, but as a strategy it also has to address 
the issue of finance. 
Remunicipalisation leaves unresolved questions of financing (where the capital comes from 
to build the infrastructure) and funding (the charges levied for the use of the infrastructure).
2 Turner, G 2013 Money Down the Drain: Getting a Better Deal for Consumers from the Water Industry (Centre Forum)
3 Armitage, S 2012 “Demand for Dividends: The Case of UK Water Companies“ in Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, 39, pp464-499
4 Hall, D 2012 Remunicipalising Municipal Services in Europe (Public Services International Research Unit)
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This is a wider political issue, because – among other things – investors will be looking for 
a return, and this can only be provided by taxpayers or by users. In the case of water, the 
issue is about charges to users and does not involve the taxpayer because of the existence 
of a “regulatory asset base”. What remunicipalisation may well enable is much clearer and 
more transparent control of the processes of financing, the links between charges and 
investor returns, and fuller control over reinvestment in the water infrastructure. 
Utilities, then, are not something conveniently separable from the world of finance, easily 
retrieved and placed neatly back into public ownership through a one-o programme of 
renationalisation or remunicipalisation. There are other ways to bring utilities such as water 
eectively under public control, principally by using, not rejecting, private finance; that is, 
by tailoring it to the needs of bill-paying households, both in terms of price and future 
investment. In other words, by adapting private finance to provide water customised for 
citizens.
The privately owned Welsh Water (Dwr Cymru) is a case in point. Welsh Water, as mentioned 
earlier, is a not-for-profit company with no shareholders yet, unlike its global financial 
counterparts in the water industry, it has used securitisation to good eect.5 Rather 
than use the financing technique to disperse tax-ecient profits globally, they used it to 
raise bonds to finance their assets and capital investment programmes, and retained the 
surpluses to reinvest in the water business. As such, the financial eciencies gained have 
been passed onto the customer in the shape of an annual “customer dividend” and lower 
water bills, rather than oshored into the pockets of global investors. 
Moreover, because it does not have shareholders or issue equity, a good credit rating 
matters to Welsh Water’s investment performance, and its ability to reduce its gearing has 
enabled it to raise further investment funds. Indeed, the company’s sound use of private 
finance has met with the approval of the leading rating agencies, earning an A rating (the 
only such rating in the sector). 
Ironically, such stability and predictability were sold by the sector’s delisted consortia 
owners as precisely the qualities that ringfenced, privately controlled water monopolies 
could oer investors globally. These qualities are evident in Welsh Water’s performance and 
are precisely the characteristics looked for by pension funds and insurance companies as 
they search for safe outlets for their investment monies. 
Thus the opportunity presents itself to establish a dierent type of ownership in the 
5 Bayliss, K 2014 The Financialisation of Water in England and Wales, Working Paper Series 52, (FESSUD)
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English water sector, one that provides investment opportunities to private investors, 
yet guides such investment monies into utilities that work for customers, not 
shareholders or their financial intermediaries. The accountable nature of ownership 
and the question of who benefits can coexist with private finance in a transparent 
manner, where distributed profits circulate in the local, not the offshore economy.    
The political issue, then, does not boil down to some kind of Orwellian equation – 
“private finance bad, public ownership good” – but recognises that private finance can 
be used to renew and build water infrastructure and put to work transparently, shaped 
to meet the needs of a nation’s households. The impact of financialisation in and on 
the everyday has not been well articulated politically in England. But to start to talk 
about a fight-back in terms of nationalisation or municipalisation is perhaps to miss 
the point. The task, as we have tried to sketch in terms of just one type of utility, is to 
politicise the effects of financialisation so that we can master private finance rather 
than be its slave. 
To combat shadowy financial practices and evasive offshore dealings is a political task 
that goes well beyond the scope of the nation’s privatised water, but a first step towards 
sidestepping such unaccountable and opaque structures is to bring ownership within 
reach of those who can manage the asset for the benefit of customers, whether they 
be public or private bodies, funded by foreign pension funds and insurance companies 
or otherwise. Offshoring the nation’s water simply makes such a possibility ever more 
remote. 
